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®ED

The Committee
for Economic Development

The Committee for Economic Development is composed of
200 leading businessmen and educators.
CED is devoted to these basic objectives:
1) To develop, through objective research and discussion, findings and

recommendations for business and public policy which will contribute
to the preservation and strengthening of our free society, and to the
maintenance of high employment, increasing productivity and living
standards, greater economic stability and greater opportunity for all
our people.
2) To bring about increasing public understanding of the importance of

these objectives and the ways in which they can be achieved.
CED's work is supported by voluntary contributions from business and
industry. It is nonprofit, nonpartisan and nonpolitical.
The Trustees, who generally are Presidents or Board Chairmen of corporations and Presidents of universities, are chosen for their individual
capacities rather than as representatives of any particular interests. They
unite scholarship with business judgment and experience in analyzing the
issues and developing recommendations to resolve the economic problems
that constantly arise in a dynamic and democratic society.
Through this business-academic partnership, CED endeavors to develop
policy statements and other research products that commend themselves
as guides to public and business policy; for use as texts in college economic
and political science courses and in management training courses; for consideration and discussion by newspaper and magazine editors, columnists
and commentators, and for distribution abroad to promote better understanding of the American economic system.
CED believes that by enabling businessmen to demonstrate constructively
their concern for the general welfare, it is helping business to earn and
maintain the national and community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist system.
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The Responsibility for
CED Statements on National Policy
This statement has been approved for publication by the members of the Research and Policy Committee and of the Committee for Improvement of
Management in Government, subject to individual dissents or reservations
noted herein. The individuals who are responsible for this statement are listed
on the opposite page. Company or institutional associations are included
for identification only; the companies or institutions do not share in the responsibility borne by the individual members of the two committees.
The Research and Policy Committee is directed by CED's bylaws to:
"Initiate studies into the principles of business policy and of public policy
which will foster the full contribution by industry and commerce to the attainment and maintenance of high and secure standards of living for people in all
walks of life through maximum employment and high productivity in the
domestic economy."
The bylaws emphasize that:
"All research is to be thoroughly objective in character, and the approach
in each instance is to be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not
from that of any special political or economic group."
The Research and Policy Committee is composed of 50 Trustees from
among the 200 businessmen and educators who comprise the Committee for
Economic Development. It is aided by a Research Advisory Board of leading
economists, a small permanent Research Staff, and by advisers chosen for their
competence in the field being considered.
Each Statement on National Policy is preceded by discussions, meetings,
and exchanges of memoranda, often stretching over many months. The research
is undertaken by a subcommittee, with its advisers. For this statement the Committee for Improvement of Management in Government acted as a subcommittee. lt together with the full Research and Policy Committee participated
in the drafting of findings and recommendations.
Except for the members of the Research and Policy Committee and the
Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, the recommendations presented herein are not necessarily endorsed by other Trustees or by the
advisers, contributors, staff members, or others associated with CED.
The Research and Policy Committee offers this Statement on National
Policy as an aid to clearer understanding of steps to be taken in achieving
improvement in the operations of the American economy. The Committee is
not attempting to pass on any pending specific legislative proposals; its purpose
is to urge careful consideration of the objectives set forth in the statement and
of the best means of accomplishing those objectives.
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Foreword
This statement, prepared by the Committee for Improvement of
Management in Government, is approved and issued by the Research
and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development.
Presidential succession and inability have been of recurring concern to the nation for more than a century. We need clearly determined
means to transfer the duties and powers of the Presidency quickly, but
in a legitimate and orderly way, when death or inability of the President
occurs. Our proposals are directed to that effect. They also provide ways
for filling any vacancy that may occur in the Vice Presidency.
Our consideration of these problems was assisted materially by
the consensus reached by the American Bar Association, and published
( 1964) in the report, "Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy." We acknowledge, also, the help of Demetrios Carnley of Barnard
College; John Feerick of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New
York City; and Vincent Doyle of the Library of Congress. Their knowledge of American history, politics, and constitutional law served the
Committee well. As consultants, however, they are not responsible for
our conclusions or recommendations.
On behalf of the Research and Policy Committee I wish to express our gratitude to Mr. Marion B. Folsom as Chairman and Mr. John
A. Perkins as Vice Chairman, and to the members of the Committee for
Improvement of Management in Government, its advisors and consultants. I also wish to express our appreciation for the financial assistance
received from the Carnegie Corporation, the Edgar Stern Family Fund,
and other foundations in making this and additional statements possible.
Theodore 0. Yntema, Chairman
Research and Policy Committee
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1.

Introduction

The office of President of the United States is the toughest and
most important job in the world. It has a unique concentration of those
powers and responsibilities that in most other nations are shared by two
or three top officials. For this reason vacancies, inability, and transitions
in this office are matters of gravest concern to our country and to the
world.
As chief of state, the President symbolizes the sovereignty and
unity of the American people. As chief executive of the government,
he is in active charge of the affairs of the national administration. As
Constitutional commander in chief of the military services, the President
controls both the nuclear trigger and the use of all other military force.
As chief initiator and implementer of foreign policy, he is expected to
mold a world environment in which resort to nuclear weapons will not
be necessary.
As the main source of proposals for major legislative action, the
President's leadership is essential if Congress is to perform its own role
properly. By custom, the President is responsible for the direction and
management of his political party. Finally, the President is looked to as
the all-around national problem-solver, who is expected to head off
strikes and depressions, assist victims of flood and famine, and move
immediately with some kind of solution in almost every large-scale emergency or crisis.

Importance of Smooth Transition
The President's active leadership is so essential to the effective
operation of the government that his death or serious illness not only
constitutes a personal tragedy but creates the risk of national disaster.
When President Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963, the
American people were shocked and grieved by his loss, but, even more
importantly, they felt grave concern for the safety of the Republic.
Fortunately, the Presidential powers and duties were quickly
assumed by a new President who immediately sought to remove public
anxiety. Less than two hours after President Kennedy's death, Vice President Johnson took the Presidential oath of office. In less than a week, in
9

an address to Congress, President Johnson made clear that the policies
and programs of his predecessor would be continued under his administration.
There are potential situations, however, under which a smooth
transition would not occur. There is no guarantee that virtually uninterrupted exercise of Presidential powers and duties would always be
repeated. There are serious gaps and ambiguities in the Constitution
concerning vacancy or inability in the Presidential office. The pertinent
provision is found in Article II, Section 1.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President
and the Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

Although this arrangement has served reasonably well on mostthough not all-past occasions, it leaves many open questions.

Need for Clarification
The United States has never experienced a case where both Presidential and Vice Presidential offices became vacant within a four-year
term, and the succession statutes have never been tested.
More fundamentally, the Constitution is not clear about
-What actually constitutes inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the Presidential office;
-Who determines that such inability exists;
-Whether, in the event of Presidential inability, it is only the powers
and duties of the Presidency that devolve on the Vice President, or
the office itself.

Despite the urgent need for solution-demonstrated dramatically
and repeatedly in recent years-neither corrective legislation nor constitutional amendment has been adopted.

Senate Proposal
In September of 1964 the Senate approved a proposed constitu-

tional amendment by unanimous vote. It provides for keeping the office
of Vice President filled , and also deals with the problem of Presidential
inability. Although the House of Representatives has taken no action on
10

this proposal, Senate approval justifies its careful study. It reads:
SECTION 1.
In case of the removal of the President from office
or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.

2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of Vice
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall
take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.

SECTION

3. If the President declares in writing that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
SECTION

4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the heads
of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmits to the Congress his written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
SE CTION

5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President, with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive
departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmits within two days to the Congress his written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall immediately decide the
issue. If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge
the same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
SECTION

Criteria for Judgment of Proposals
This Committee is convinced that the issues of succession and
inability are vital and must be faced by the nation without further delay.
We have sought to examine each alternative that has been seriously proposed, and to identify its advantages and disadvantages.
The Committee recognizes that no solution can be perfect. All
alternative solutions have gaps. In analyzing the alternatives this Committee has judged their pros and cons against these basic criteria:

11

Continuity in the Presidential office:
In event of either death or inability of the President, there must
be no break in the exercise of the powers and duties of the Presidency;
Legitimacy:
Any transfer of the Presidential office or its powers and duties must
be fully acceptable to government officials and to the general public;
Certainty:
No question of doubt should be permitted to arise as to who is
exercising the powers and duties of the Presidency at any time-two
men competing for Presidential authority would be disastrous for the
nation;
Stability in policy:
There should be no sharp shift in policy or change of party;
Speed and simplicity in procedures:
The procedures by which either the Presidential office or its powers
and duties are transferred must be fast, efficient, and easily understood;
Preservation of the separation of powers:
Whatever corrective action may be taken, it must not weaken our
traditional pattern of separation of powers, particularly between the
Presidency and Congress.

The Committee is convinced that correct solutions must meet all
these tests.

12

2. Filling Vice Presidential
Vacancies
Eight of our 35 Presidents have died in office. 1 On sixteen different
occasions, totaling more than 37 years, the Vice Presidential office has
been vacant. Eight Vice Presidents succeeded to the Presidency, seven
died during their terms of office, and one resigned. It is merely a fortunate
chance that both Presidential and Vice Presidential offices have never
been vacant simultaneously during a single four-year elective span. *
Of the four Presidents immediately preceding L yndon B. Johnson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy did not live out their
terms; Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered a serious heart attack ; and Harry
S. Truman was the object of an attempted assassination. These events
prove the importance of having a potential Presidential successor available at all times. This person must be fully acquainted with current policy
in domestic and foreign affairs, and be prepared to assume the Presidency
on a moment's notice, with its corresponding powers and duties.
The Presidential successor should be basically sympathetic to the
plans and aspirations of the incumbent President. Continuity and consistency require that he should not undertake abrupt shifts in governmental policy. To do so might disrupt public confidence in the aftermath of
a succession crisis. We conclude that there must always be a full-time
Vice President intimately associated with the President, if these criteria
are to be met.
In line with this view, there has been an increasing tendency for
Presidents to use their Vice Presidents for a variety of important assignments. Under President Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace helped run important war agencies. Alben W. Barkley, President Truman's Vice President, was added as a statutory member of the National Security Council,
and participated directly in making foreign and military policy decisions.
Mr. Barkley also served President Truman as a link with Congress.
Especially after President Eisenhower's first illness, Vice President Richard M. Nixon took on more responsibilities. In the President's
I See

table in the Appendix, p. 36.

*See Memorandum by

MR. WILLIAM BE NTON,

page 39.
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several absences he presided over meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. Mr. Nixon served as chairman of the Committee
on Government Contracts and of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability and Economic Growth. Representing the President, he also undertook numerous missions to foreign countries.
Under President Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson was one of the
most active Vice Presidents in history. He participated in meetings of
the Cabinet and the National Security Council. He, too, made extensive
trips abroad as a Presidential emissary, helping him to become acquainted
with foreign leaders. Mr. Johnson also served as chairman of the Peace
Corps Advisory Committee, of the National Aeronautics and Space
Council and of the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity Employment.
1. We recommend that the Constitution be amended to provide for
filling the Vice Presidential office
whenever it becomes vacant.

Alternative Proposals for
Filling Vice Presidential
Vacancies
A number of alternative methods could be used to fill vacancies
in the office of Vice President:

HOW TO AMEND
To be adopted as part of the Constitution, a proposed amendment
normally must be approved by a
two-thirds vote in each House of
Congress and ratified by threefourths of the fifty states. The provision for calling a constitutional
convention, with its product to be
ratified by three-fourths of the
states, has not yet been used.

• Selection of a new Vice President in a special election;
• Selection of a new Vice President by the electoral college;
• Establishment of a "Second" or "Legislative Vice President" automatically to become the "First" or "Executive Vice President" in case
of a vacancy;
• Selection of a new Vice President by Congress;
• Selection of a new Vice President through nomination by the President with some form of Congressional approval.

Special Vice Presidential Election. A special election to fill a
vacancy in the Vice Presidency would appear to have a singular advantage in following an established democratic process. However, an extra
nationwide election for either the Presidency or Vice Presidency, with
the campaigning and other interruption of normal governmental pro14

cesses that it entails, would be highly disruptive.
An open, interim election might result in a Vice President of a
different party from the President's, which would weaken the Presidency.
However, mechanisms for limiting election to members of the President's
party would be most difficult to devise.
Selection By the Electoral College. The proposal for having the
electoral college select a new Vice President would avoid the disruption
of a special popular election, while still seeming to rely on the regular
electoral process. But the electoral college does not exist as a single
body. It must assemble, in segments, in the 50 state capitols and the District of Columbia. Its attempted use would lead to selection of a potential
President by some 538 virtually unknown individuals not realistically
representative.
Multiple Vice Presidents. Having two or more Vice Presidents
would provide greater probability that one would survive to be available
as a full-time Presidential successor. To divide the limited Vice Presidential powers and duties, just when the importance of the office has
come to be better recognized, however, might lower the quality of those
who would seek even a "First Vice Presidency."
Having two or more Vice Presidencies would place the Presidential nominee under more pressure to give representation on the national
ticket to factional, sectional, or ethnic wings within the party. This could
result in a choice of potential successors unable to work closely with the
President or with each other.*
Selection By Congress. Selection of a new Vice President solely
by Congress has the advantage of appearing closest to a popular choice,
without the delay and disruption of a special election.
One major disadvantage of this selection process is the possibility that a Vice President could be chosen with a policy outlook incompatible with that of the President. A more serious disadvantage is that
Congress would acquire a measure of control over the selection of potential Presidents that it has never had. The traditional American pattern
of separation of powers would be shifted toward legislative supremacy.
Congressional Approval After Presidential Nomination. The
proposal for nomination of a candidate by the President with approval
by one or both Houses of Congress has strongest general support. The
restriction of choice to Presidential nominees would insure acceptability
to the President. Congressional approval would serve as a check, symbolizing popular participation and establishing legitimacy.
*See Memorandum by

MR. JOHN F. MERRIAM,

page 40.
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2.

We recommend that the Constitution be amended to provide that any

vacancy in the office of Vice President be filled through nomination by the
President with approval by Congress.,;,

This Congressional approval of Presidential nominees to fill vacancies in the Vice Presidency might take one of three forms:
• Confirmation by the Senate alone;
• Approval by majorities of those present and voting in both Houses
of Congress acting separately;
• Approval by a majority of those present and voting at a joint session
of Congress.
Proponents of Congressional approval through simple Senatorial
confirmation argue that, since the Senate confirms all other Presidential
nominations, it is better equipped by reason of experience, structure, and
procedures to perform this function. They also point out that the Constitution specifies that, when no Vice Presidential candidate receives a
majority of electoral votes, the Senate shall select the Vice President
from the candidates with the two highest numbers of such votes.
Those who want the House of Representatives to participate,
either separately or in joint session, argue that this would tend to elevate
the Vice Presidency above all other executive appointments. Prior approval by both Houses of Congress would strengthen legitimacy. The
Senate does not reflect population differences, whereas the Senate and
House together duplicate the allocation of electoral votes among the
states.
For these reasons, the Committee believes the House should participate in the confirmation process. Whether the House and Senate
should act separately or in joint session may be argued. Those who favor
separate House appr.oval point out that there are no precedents or established rules of procedure for Congress to act in joint session. Neither, of
course, does the House presently confirm any appointments.
We suggest that rules of procedure could be adopted making action in joint session more expeditious than with the two Houses voting
separately. We are impressed by the fact that a joint session would duplicate electoral vote allocation among the several states.
3.

We recommend that the Constitution he amended to provide for filling

any vacancy in the office of Vice President through nomination by the President with approval by a majority of Senators and Representatives present and
voting in a joint session of Congress.*
'''See Memorandum by
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MR. JOHN F. MERRIAM,

page 40.

3. Changing the Line
of Succession
If provision is made for keeping the Vice Presidency filled at all
times, the further line of Presidential succession loses much of its importance. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that both Presidential and Vice
Presidential offices could become vacant simultaneously. In that case
some successor would have to take office.
The framers of the Constitution made provision for this eventuality in Article II, Section 1, which gives Congress authority to
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer
shall then act as President ...

Congress passed a succession law in 1792, pursuant to this section. There was considerable Congressional debate at that time over
whether the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House are Constitutional "officers" eligible for designation as Presidential successors under the terms of Article II, Section 1. Nevertheless, they
were named as the potential successors, in that order.
The law of 1792 was changed in 1886, placing the heads of the
several executive departments in
line of succession directly after the
SUCCESSION ORDER
Vice President. First in order of
Under
the statute of 1886, the
precedence was the Secretary of
succession followed this order :
State.
Secretary of State, Secretary of
Three shortcomings in the
the ·Treasury, Secretary of War,
Attorney General, Postmaster Genearlier system led to this change.
eral, Sec retary of the Navy, and
At the time of President Andrew
Secretary of the Interior. It has been
suggested that, with War and Navy
Johnson's impeachment, there
Departments now combined in a
was no Vice President. Hence,
single department, the Secretary of
Defense should be brought up to
the Senate could have elevated its
second in the line, following the
own presiding officer to the PresiSecretary of State.
dency by convicting the incumbent President. No other Presi-
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dent has had to face impeachment proceedings, but another serious
shortcoming has also become evident over the years. Frequently, the
President pro tempore or the Speaker, or both, have been members of a
political party opposed to the President's. Parenthetically, during two
periods of Vice Presidential vacancy-when President James A. Garfield
died in 1881 and when Vice President Thomas A. Hendricks died in
1885-there was at the moment neither a Speaker nor a President pro
tempore.
The most recent change in the succession law was made in 194 7.
It placed the Speaker first, followed by the President pro tempore, ahead
of the Cabinet members in the line of succession. President Truman
supported this reversion, on the ground that a President should not be
required to choose his own potential successor in the process of naming
a Secretary of State. He argued that the Speaker and the President pro
tempore are elected to their posts by legislative bodies representing all
the people. This Committee does not concur with this reasoning, nor
with the present statute based on it.
The records of the Constitutional Convention, and the language
of the Constitution itself, cast strong doubt on whether the Speaker and
the President pro tempore are "officers" eligible for succession to executive authority as required in the Constitutional sense. Even if this doubt
were resolved, the requirement that the Speaker-or the President pro
tempore-must resign his Congressional position before acting as President would force him to sacrifice a long legislative career even for the
briefest Presidential tour of duty. This objection has special weight in
cases of temporary Presidential inability, when his powers and duties
would be assumed by his "successor" for only a limited period of days
or weeks.
One strange effect of the present statute is that it gives the House
of Representatives a possible series of succession choices during a single
four-year term. This occurs because, after a Speaker had succeeded to
the Presidency, the House would choose a new Speaker, who would then
be first in the line of succession.
However great may have been the personal abilities of incumbents who have held these offices, it is clear that their preparation for
sudden elevation to the Presidency could not approach that of a Vice
President, nor that of a leading Cabinet member. The demands of their
important full-time jobs do not permit them to observe and to participate
in day-to-day Presidential activities, as leading Cabinet officers do. The
Speaker, for example, functions as chief leader of the majority party in
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the House, and presides over a 435-member legislative body, in addition
to performing the duties of a regular Congressman. Exercise of these
legislative responsibilities requires his undivided attention.
During eight of the past eighteen years the House of Representatives has been controlled by the party opposing that of the President.
Hence, succession to the Presidency by the Speaker oftentimes could
change party control of the entire Executive Branch.
1.

We recommend that the 1886 succession law be restored with the heads

of executive departments taking their former positions in the line of succession.~'

*See Memorandum by

MR. JOHN F . MERRIAM,

page 40.
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4. Determining Presidential
Inability
Problems concerning Presidential inability pose greater difficulties than vacancies in the Vice Presidency. They arise directly from the
language of the Constitution.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Power and Duties
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President ...
This brief passage raises questions on three important points:
-In case of Presidential inability, whether the Vice President assumes
"the powers and duties" of the Presidency or the "office" itself;
-How commencement of Presidential inability is established;
-How termination of Presidential inability is decided.

Devolution of "Office"
or of "Powers and Duties"
The Constitution does not distinguish between Presidential "inability" and vacancy in the Presidential office due to "removal," "death,"
or "resignation." In context, there is no ambiguity concerning removal,
death, or resignation; but "inability" is not defined in the Constitution.
Congress lacks final authority to define Constitutional terms. Clarification, making more specific dispositions concerning exercise of discretion
in these matters, depends on adoption of a formal amendment.
The first situation contemplated in this clause of the Constitution
occurred upon the death of President William Henry Harrison in April,
1841. Two days later, Vice President John Tyler took the oath of
office as "President of the United States." A few newspapers-and some
members of Congress-objected to Tyler's assumption of the Presidency,
arguing that he was still only "Acting President." The objection was dismissed a few weeks later, when Congress overwhelmingly approved a
resolution appointing a committee to wait on "the President of the United
States" and to inform him that a quorum of the two Houses had assembled in special session.
The precedent set with Tyler has been confirmed seven times.
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Upon the death of their predecessors, few questioned that Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, Chester A. Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin
Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, or Lyndon B. Johnson had actually become
President. This custom has served well, because the person permanently
exercising Presidential powers and duties needs to hold the full dignity
and prestige of the Presidential office. It is now the established rule of
succession that when a President dies the Vice President becomes
President.
Beneficial as this custom has been, it has had unexpected and
unfortunate collateral effects. The Constitution does not distinguish
between Presidential vacancy and inability, and it has been possible to
claim that in the case of temporary Presidential inability the Vice President would assume not only the powers and duties of the office but the
permanent office of President. President Garfield, shot by an assassin
in 1881, did not die until 80 days later. Vice President Arthur refused
to exercise the Presidential powers and duties, largely because both he
and the Cabinet feared that by so doing he might displace Garfield
permanently as President.
During the eight days President William McKinley lived after he
was shot in 1901, governmental business came to a standstill. Another
-far more prolonged-period of Presidential inability occurred when
Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke paralyzing his left side. For most of
the eighteen months while the President was seriously ill, his wife, his
personal physician, and the Cabinet struggled to conduct the affairs of
state. Mrs. Wilson largely determined what papers the President might
see, to whom he might talk, and for how long.
President Wilson did not meet with his Cabinet for eight months;
he allowed 28 bills to become law by failure to act within the requisite
ten days; and he did not even receive new foreign ambassadors, as required by the Constitution. Most important, at certain critical times in
the negotiations, the President's physician refused to let Senate leaders
of his own party talk to him about a possible compromise of issues involving the Versailles Treaty, which if accepted by opposing groups
might have led to its ratification .
As in President Arthur's case, Vice President Thomas R. Marshall refused to exercise the President's "powers and duties." When the
possibility was raised, President Wilson's White House advisers-and
the Cabinet-refused to declare him disabled, fearing that Wilson would
be permanently displaced.
The exercise of Presidential powers and duties was suspended
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again-this time briefly-during President Harding's fatal illness. Still, no
corrective measures were adopted, either statutory or amendatory.
The most recent instances of extended Presidential inability ·occurred in the Eisenhower administration. In September, 1955, President
Eisenhower suffered a "moderate" coronary thrombosis, hospitalizing
him for six weeks . The President was practically incommunicado for the
first week, and only gradually resumed normal Presidential powers and
duties. He attended no Cabinet meeting for two months after his attack.
During this period Vice President Nixon did not exercise Presidential powers and duties. The most important administrative decisions
were made by Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams, by other members
of the White House staff, and by members of the Cabinet. Fortunately,
since Congress was not in session, no bills awaited signature. Even more
fortunately, no major foreign or domestic emergencies developed.
In June of 1956, President Eisenhower suffered an ileitis attack
and underwent an emergency operation. Again, he was hospitalized, this
time for three weeks, but he was soon able to perform most of his duties.
In November of 1957, President Eisenhower suffered a mild stroke which
briefly impaired his speech.
Three months after his last illness President Eisenhower made
public the text of an informal agreement with Vice President Nixon
concerning the problem of Presidential inability. Dated March 3, 1958,
it stated:
1. In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so
inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve as
acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the President
from so communicating with the Vice President, the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under
the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as acting President
until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the inability had ended and at that time would resume the full exercise
of the powers and duties of the office.

In August of 1961, President Kennedy announced an identical
agreement between himself and Vice President Johnson. In December
of 1963, it was announced that President Johnson and House Speaker
John W. McCormack, then first in line to succeed to the Presidency,
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had agreed upon the same formula.
These informal agreements are a significant advance, but uncertainty persists about who may be in charge of the government under
certain circumstances. It is our view that any uncertainty in this matter
is intolerable and must be resolved. The existence of nuclear weapons
requires that there be a chief executive with clear authority to act at all
times. Even the briefest delay in activating defense or retaliatory forces
in a crisis could lead to national disaster.
When it was revealed, in the fall of 1962, that missile emplacements were being built in Cuba, prompt action had to be taken. Inaction
would have resulted in a drastic and possibly irreversible shift in the
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Once
again, when our destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin in the
summer of 1964, a decision on retaliation had to be taken almost instantaneously. Only the President, or an official who is clearly authorized
to act as President, can make such a decision.
Even in less crisis-laden domestic matters, many built-in deadlines
require immediate Presidential decision. When Congress is in session,
Presidential inaction on bills passed by Congress automatically makes
them laws. Once Congress adjourns, Presidential inaction automatically
kills bills by "pocket veto."
Annual budgets have to be submitted to Congress by certain calendar deadlines, and only the President can do so. Moreover, inability
of the President may force other officials to determine matters within
the President's prerogatives, and this in turn may cause conflicts among
officials of the Executive Branch. Unquestioned Presidential authority
is essential if the government is to function properly.
In the Garfield and Wilson illnesses, inaction by the Vice Presidents can be traced partly to their feeling that exercising Presidential
powers might permanently displace temporarily incapacitated Presidents. Although the Eisenhower-Nixon, Kennedy-Johnson, and JohnsonMcCormack agreements recognize the temporary nature of any devolution of Presidential powers because of inability, the Constitution itself
should be clarified on this point.
1.

We recommend that the Constitution be amended to require that in case

of Presidential inability the Vice President shall act as President, assuming
full Presidential powers and duties during the period of inability.

There is a two-fold problem in establishing Presidential inability.
First, what constitutes an inability requiring devolution of Presidential
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powers and duties to the Vice President or other officer in line of succession? Second, how is the beginning of such an inability to be determined?

The Meaning of "Inability"
Records of the Constitutional Convention give no evidence about
what kinds of situations the framers intended to cover by the terms "inability" and "disability." The first extended discussion of the meaning
of the term "inability" took place during President Garfield's illness.
One point of view was that the "inability" recognized by the Constitution was a mental or intellectual incapacity such as insanity. Others
held that "inability" exists whenever the President is in fact unable to
exercise his powers, whatever the cause.
An additional distinction has been made between "temporary"
and "permanent" inability. It has been argued that temporary inability
does not justify the exercise of Presidential powers by the Vice President,
whereas permanent inability does. This distinction was considered especially important by those who assumed that an Acting Vice President
would succeed to the "office" of President, permanently displacing the
incumbent.
2.

We recommend that the term Presidential "inability" be left undefined

in the Constitution, and that it continue to be understood to mean any situation in which the President is unable to exercise the powers and duties of his
office.

Acceptance of this meaning of "inability" should facilitate the
continuous exercise of Presidential powers and duties. The controlling
criteria then become the President's condition and the contingencies
he must meet. Thus, in time of crisis or war even a brief illness would
constitute inability. In an extended period of peace and tranquility a
more prolonged illness might not be disabling.
Whether the cause of the inability be mental or physical is immaterial. It is equally irrelevant whether the President will or will not
recover his full capacities; continuous, uninterrupted exercise of Presidential powers should not depend on anyone's ability as a prophet.
We believe that any attempt to define or to amplify the meaning
of the term "inability" in the Constitution could be undesirably restrictive. It might provide a basis for new arguments about whether some
particular kind of incapacity (for example, a President being held hostage while abroad) is included.
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Alternative Methods for Determining Inability
No one has ever seriously questioned the right of the President to
declare his own inability and request the Vice President to exercise the
Presidential powers and duties until the inability ceases. When it is universally recognized that only the Presidential powers and duties-not
the office-devolve in the case of inability, the President will be less
reluctant to admit that he is temporarily unable to perform his responsibilities effectively.
The situation is more serious when the President is either unable
or unwilling to declare his inability. In the absence of a Presidential
declaration, who is to decide whether a President suffers such "inability"
to perform his powers and duties that they should be exercised by the
Vice President-or the person next in line of succession? There have been
several widely suggested arrangements, some of which would require
Constitutional amendment, among them:
The Vice President declares the President's inability ( a ) on his own
authority, or ( b) with the concurrence of some other special constitutional or statutory tribunal;
The Cabinet declares the President's inability on its own authority.

The Vice President on His Own Authority . Most Constitutional
authorities agree that, under present language, the Vice President has
the right to declare the President's inability if the latter should be incapable or unwilling to do so himself. Since Article II, Section 1, imposes
on the Vice President the duty to act as President in such case, he alone
is presumed to be the judge of the facts.

The seeming advantage of this interpretation is that determination of inability may be made simply, quickly, and clearly. Although it
has never been used, this position could be established beyond question
by amending the Constitution to specify the Vice President's sole right
to decide Presidential inability. This places the decision in the hands of
a visible public official responsible to a nationwide electorate.
A disadvantage of placing the decision solely with the Vice President lies in a conceivable usurpation of Presidential powers and duties
by an unscrupulous Vice President. Needless to say, such an eventuality
has never occurred. On the other hand, as borne out by past experience,
the Vice President may refuse to assume Presidential powers and duties
in order to avoid any appearance of self-seeking or usurpation.
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Special Tribunal. Another proposed method for establishing Presidential inability is to place responsibility for the decision on some special
tribunal, empowered to act either on its own or the Vice President's
initiative. The advantages offered for such a tribunal are its apparent
detachment and its great prestige - hopefully causing its decisions to be
accepted without challenge. The disadvantages include its lack of
political responsibility, the possibility of a split decision weakening its
acceptability, and the inherent delay in reaching a decision because of a
probable need for holding extensive hearings.
The Cabinet on Its Own Authority. Despite the weight of the
argument for the Vice President's legal authority to determine the President's inability and to assume the Presidential powers and duties on his
own discretion, no Vice President has ever acted accordingly. An instant capability for replacement of a disabled President has merit - in
light of existing nuclear armaments - but historical precedents as well
as our more normal expectations of future situations both suggest a
different atmosphere in which action is more likely to be required. On
this subject, the late President Hoover has said:
In my view, the determination of inability and its termination
should rest with the Cabinet, and the executive powers should be
executed by the Vice President during any such period.
My reasons for this view are as follows:
1. The Cabinet (members) are in intimate contact with the
President during any illness.
2. They can appraise the national setting as to whether there
is any emergency which requires any action beyond the
President's abilities.

Since the Cabinet 1 is in a position to obtain firsthand information about the President's medical condition more quickly than any
other group, it could act with dispatch. Because its members are appointed by the President - with the advice and consent of the Senate it would not be inclined to exercise such power except in a proper case.
If given Constitutional sanction the Cabinet's decision would most likely
meet with public acceptance. Thus, the legitimacy of the Acting President would be fully recognized.
This proposal would overcome the serious problem of Vice Presi1 As

used here, and throughout this discussion, the "Cabinet" refers to the heads of the
executive departments, now ten in number. Others attending Cabinet meetings-e.g.,
the Ambassador to the U.N.-would have no vote.
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dential reluctance to assume the Presidential powers and duties, even
when evident Presidential inability has extended over a long period of
time, as in the Garfield and Wilson cases. Legal authority for the
Cabinet to decide inability would absolve the Vice President of any
accusation of usurpation of power. At the same time, the possibility of
attempted usurpation by the Vice President would be eliminated.
The problems facing a Vice President called upon to assume the
powers and duties of the Presidency - with an elected President still
living - are so great and far-reaching that every effort should be made
to ease his burden. Placing responsibility for accession upon the trusted
political associates of the President would strengthen the Vice Presidential hand in a delicate and difficult situation.
Since the Cabinet might be factionalized, it has been said that
giving the Cabinet a decisive role in this area would be dangerous. This
is not in harmony with historical experience. It was the Cabinet - its
members working in harmony - that administered the government
during the Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower inabilities. The Cabinet
was a stabilizing factor in each of the eight transitions when Vice
Presidents were elevated to the Presidency.
Both the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets felt that there was need
for an Acting President. Lack of Constitutional authority for the Cabinet
to decide the issue and Constitutional ambiguity concerning the role of
the Vice President prevented them from taking the action they believed
to be in the national interest. Given authority through Constitutional
clarification, it seems certain that these Cabinets would have declared
their Presidents disabled.
An argument against Cabinet authority to declare a President
disabled is that this would affect the power relationship between its
members and the President. It is hard to see, however, how this would
affect the President's relationship with his Cabinet any more than the
impeachment power affects the Presidential relationship with Congress.
If part of the Cabinet were to act in such a manner as to disrupt the
relationship, the President could replace those out of sympathy with him.
The concern that the Cabinet might not be unanimous - indeed
that it might be closely divided - adds weight to the need for its official
judgment. To understand the importance of concurrence by the Cabinet
we must conceive of a situation where the Vice President might try to
assert his authority against the objections of a majority of the Cabinet.
The resulting confusion and discord would present a threat to national
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security - perhaps a greater threat than that caused by temporary
Presidential disability without the assumption of his powers and duties
by anyone.
This leads to another point. With the decisive role given to the
Cabinet, the President would be less reluctant to declare his own inability. Conversely, if some other body were to have the power, the
President might fear that it would tend to disagree with him when he
declared the end of his inability.
Time permitting, the Cabinet might wish to seek the best available advice from whatever quarter. The late President Hoover suggested
this to the Senate Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments
in January of 1958.
All of which leads me to the generalization that a President's inability to serve or his possible restoration to office should be determined by the leading officials in the executive branch, as they are
of the party having the responsibilities determined by the election.
I believe that a simple amendment to the Constitution (or possibly
statutory law) could provide for a commission made up from the
executive branch to make the determinations required. I do not
suggest that the individual persons be named but that the departments or agencies be enumerated, whose chief official or head
should be a member of such a commission. The number could
well be limited to not less than 7 and not more than 15 such heads
of departments or agencies. There could be a further provision
that they should seek the advice of a panel of experienced physicians or surgeons.
I cannot conceive of any circumstance when such a defined body
of leaders from the executive branch would act in these circumstances otherwise than in the national interest.

To implement Cabinet authority any member or the Vice President, if he desires, could be empowered to initiate discussion of an
issue concerning inability. A majority Cabinet vote would be required
to decide the question. We believe that concurrence in a Cabinet finding
that inability exists by the Vice President is desirable, since he is to
bear the burdens of the office. Further, he is our only other nationally
elected official, and his concurrence would strengthen public acceptance
of the Cabinet's judgment. Joint action would provide maximum evidence of legitimacy.
It is conceivable that an emergency situation could arise requiring some Presidential action before the Cabinet is able to meet or
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to otherwise determine whether Presidential inability exists. Because it
is imperative that someone have power to act as President at all times
the Vice President, in such a case, may have to assume responsibility on
his own accord. Modern communications greatly diminish the probability of this necessity. In such event the Cabinet should then decide
expeditiously whether Presidential inability requires the Vice President
to continue to act as President.
3.

We recommend that the beginning of Presidential inability he deter-

mined by a majority vote of the Cabinet, the Vice President concurring, and
that discussions leading to such vote may he initiated by the Vice President or
any member of the Cabinet.*

*See Memoranda by

M R. JOHN F. M E RRIAM

and by

MR.

c . WR EDE

PETERS M EY ER,

page 40.
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5. Terminating Inability
Once the President's inability is determined, the Vice President
assumes the Presidential powers and duties. The next crucial problem
involves the method of determining when the inability ends, so that the
President may resume the functions of his office.

Alternative Methods for Terminating Inability
The following are the most seriously considered alternatives for
placing authority to determine the end of a Presidential inability:
-The President alone decides;
- The President and the Vice President must agree, or in the event of
disagreement either (a) the Vice President's decision is final or (b)
the President's view prevails unless opposed by the Cabinet and at
least two-thirds of both Houses of Congress;
- The devolution of Presidential powers and duties is permanent and
irrevocable;
-The Cabinet decides the issue by majority vote.

The President Determines End of His Inability. One simple
method of establishing termination of Presidential inability is to allow
the President to do so by his own declaration. A responsible President,
not mentally deranged or otherwise detached from reality, should know
when he is able to exercise his powers and responsibilities. Final authority in the President places it beyond question who is exercising the
Presidential powers at any time. The disadvantage is that the President
may take back his powers and duties when, in reality, he cannot exercise
them effectively.
The President and Vice President Jointly Determine End of
Inability. Few would question seriously the right of the President to
resume his powers and duties when the Vice President also agrees that
he is able to do so. But, if the determination is placed in their hands,
what happens when the President and Vice President disagree? For all
practical purposes, the problem is the same whether raised while the
President is still exercising his office or when attempting to recapture
its powers and duties.
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The proposed amendment approved by the Senate in 1964 provides that, if the President and Vice President disagree on termination
of inability, the Vice President could retain the Presidential powers if
supported by a majority of the Cabinet. The matter would then be
immediately referred to Congress for a final decision, but, in the interim,
the Vice President would act as President. It would take a two-thirds
vote of each House to prevent the President from resuming his powers
and duties. Such a high degree of unanimity would protect the President
against possible usurpation. A decision supported by the Vice President,
a majority of the Cabinet, and two-thirds of the members in both Houses
of Congress would have the weight of legitimacy and acceptability.
A disadvantage of the Senate-approved arrangement is that it
goes too far in protecting the President. By requiring such a high degree
of unanimity to keep the President from exercising his powers, there
would be great pressure to accede to the President's self-evaluation of
his abilities without public challenge.
A more serious disadvantage is that by making Congress the
body with ultimate authority to resolve any disagreement beween the
President and Vice President, a change with possibly grave and unpredictable consequences would be made in the traditional distribution
of power between the Legislative and Executive Branches. The Constitutional Convention gave Congress authority to displace the President
only through the impeachment process. If this additional authority were
given to a Congress with a hostile two-thirds majority, such as existed
during the Presidency of Andrew Johnson, it could be used to deprive
the President of his powers and duties without resorting to the carefully
circumscribed impeachment procedure.
But the worst aspect of the Senate proposal is that, while Congress would be debating and deciding the issue, there could be two
persons both attempting to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency. Such a situation might lead to disastrous consequences, perhaps
as severe as if the country had no one to act as President. There must
always be someone to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency,
but there must never be two.
The Vice President's Decision ls Binding. A different method
for dealing with disagreement is to make the Vice President's determination final. The major advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement
are substantially those associated with allowing the Vice President to
make the decision on the beginning of Presidential inability. Because
the procedure is simple, fast, and completely clear, there would be no
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ambiguity about who is rightfully exercising the Presidential powers
and duties. But if the Vice President were given the ultimate authority
on the question, he might be tempted to withhold the Presidential
powers and duties from a President who has in fact recovered.
Devolution is Irrevocable. A narrowly held view proposes that,
once the powers and duties of the President devolve on the Vice President, they should never be returned. The presumable advantage here is
that the Vice President would be encouraged to exercise the Presidential
powers and duties to the fullest extent without concern for what might
happen after the President recovers.
But the concept of permament devolution of Presidential powers
and duties - to protect the Vice President - could result in Presidential
refusal to admit inability, however serious it might actually be. Under
such circumstances the President would probably challenge any attempt
by the Vice President or a special tribunal to establish inability.
Cabinet Decision By Majority Vote . Another alternative would
place responsibility for deciding when Presidential inability has ceased
in the hands of the Cabinet. The same considerations governing the
establishment of disability would apply to its termination. In both instances, for example, the Cabinet is most likely to be intimately aware
of the facts concerning the President's health. The Cabinet is in a position to act quickly and with minimal loss of public confidence. Since
the President appoints the Cabinet, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, its members would normally wish to restore to him the
powers and duties of the Presidency as soon as practicable.
A compelling argument for placing final authority with the Cabinet is that it would avoid the possibility of two persons attempting to
exercise the powers and duties of the President simultaneously. If the
Cabinet had responsibility for reaching a decision, the Vice President
would continue as Acting President until the Cabinet decided otherwise.
The powers and duties of the Presidency must be placed squarely on one
individual at all times - an objective not satisfactorily achieved by the
proposed Senate Amendment.
In the unlikely event that an unscrupulous Vice President should
seek to keep his hold on the Presidential office in the face of a Presidential claim of recovery, he would have to obtain support from a
majority of the Cabinet. Moreover, the Congress could, in due time, use
the impeachment process against him and the members of the Cabinet
if the justification were clear. Impeachment is more appropriate in deal32

ing with potential usurpation than the method proposed in the Senate
Amendment. The Constitutional provisions dealing with impeachment
imply that the person acting as President (be he President or Vice
President) continues to exercise the powers and duties of the office
until Congress has decided the issue.
In light of these considerations, we regard this as the preferable
alternative. On the same reasoning that led us to recommend Vice
Presidential concurrence in a Cabinet finding that Presidential inability
exists - on the ground that the person to bear the burden of the powers
and duties should agree to assume them - restoration of his powers
and duties should be clearly acceptable to the President.
I.

We recommend that the ending of Presidential inability he determined

by a majority vote of the Cabinet, the President concurring, and that discussions leading to such vote may be initiated by the President or any member
of the Cabinet.*

*See Memorandum by

MR . JOHN F . M ERRIAM ,

page 41.
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6. Conclusions
The urgency of national action to resolve the doubts and uncertainties clouding Presidential succession and inability cannot be
overly stressed. Failure to correct the deficiencies will subject the nation
to risks and hazards that are avoidable. Prompt action is imperative
This Committee has carefully measured the various alternatives
for solution against certain criteria - continuity, legitimacy, certainty,
stability, speed, simplicity, and preservation of the separation of powers
fundamental to our Constitutional system.
The United States of America must have one person wielding the
powers and duties of the Presidency at all times. Conversely, it cannot
tolerate any period of confusion in which two men compete for the
exercise of Presidential authority.
Our first major recommendation, therefore, is that the Constitution be amended to provide that any vacancy in the office of Vice
President be filled. We suggest giving the President authority to nominate a Vice President, subject to approval by joint session of Congress.
Those persons in line of succession after the Vice President must
be familiar with day-to-day Presidential activities. No other officers can
match the preparation of the Vice President and leading Cabinet members for sudden elevation to the Presidency. This Committee, therefore,
recommends that the line of succession beyond the Vice President be
revised, placing the chief Cabinet officers next in line, as under the
statute of 1886.
We recognize that solution of the problem of Presidential "inability" poses problems, but there is one point on which accepted interpretations of the present Constitution should remain unchallenged. The
word "inability" should continue to .b e understood to include every
situation where the President, for whatever reason, is unable to exercise
the powers and duties of his office. The preponderance of legal authority
now holds that the President would retain his title and "office" in case of
an established disability, while the Vice President (or whoever may be
first in line of succession) would automatically assume his powers and
duties. Clear language on this should be placed in the Constitution.
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We would not change these basic concepts as applicable to situations where the President, recognizing his own inability, calls upon the
Vice President to exercise the Presidential powers and duties. Similarly,
they apply to those situations where the President is unable to communicate his own obvious inability and where there may be need for
instantaneous action in the national interest. Beyond these situations,
however, there is need for clarification.
This Committee's second major recommendation is that authority to decide that Presidential inability exists should be placed in the
hands of the Cabinet, in consultation with the Vice President or other
successor. Any such decision should be by majority vote of the Cabinet,
the Vice President concurring, upon the initiative of any member or of
the Vice President. Termination of Presidential inability would follow
the same procedure, except that Presidential-rather than Vice Presidential-concurrence would be required. This proposal would also require Constitutional revision; but a single amendment might include this
provision with the other changes recommended.
When these two major proposals are adopted, the United States
will always have one person - and only one person - exercising the
powers and duties of the Presidency.
We regard these as the best choices among all proposed alternatives. We concede that some variations on these solutions would
improve our present situation; but we are confident that no other alterations would meet the nation's basic needs as well.*

*See Memorandum by

MR . JOHN F. M E RRIAM,

pa ge 41.
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Instances when the United States

w

°'

has been without a Vice President

Vice President

Termination of
office

Term for which
elected

Length of time
office vacant Yrs. Mos. Day

President
James Madison

George Clinton

Died Apr. 20, 1812

Mar. 4, 1809 Mar. 3, 1813

Apr. 20, 1812 Mar. 3, 1813

0

10

12

Elbridge Gerry

Died Nov. 23, 1814

Mar. 4, 1813 Mar. 3, 1817

Nov. 23 , 1814 Mar. 3, 1817

2

3

9

John C. Calhoun

Resigned Dec. 28,
1832, to take seat
in Senate

Mar. 4. 1829 Mar. 3, 1833

Dec. 28, 1832 Mar. 3, 1833

0

2

4

Andrew Jackson

John Tyler

Took oath of office
as President,
Apr. 6, 1841

Mar. 4, 1841 Mar. 3, 1845

Apr. 6, 1841 Mar. 3, 1845

3

11

0

William H. Harrison, died
Apr. 4, 1841

Millard Fillmore

Took oath of office
as President,
July 10, 1850

Mar. 5, 1849 Mar. 3, 1853

July 10, 1850 Mar. 3, 1853

2

7

23

Zachary Taylor, died
July 9, 1850

William R. King

Died Apr. 18, 1853

Mar. 4, 1853 Mar. 3, 1857

Apr. 18, 1853 Mar. 3, 1857

3

10

14

Franklin Pierce

Andrew Johnson

Took oath of office
as President,
Apr. 15, 1865

Mar. 4, 1865 Mar. 3, 1869

Apr. 15, 1865 Mar. 3, 1869

3

10

17

Abraham Lincoln, died
Apr. 15, 1865

Henry Wilson

Died Nov. 22, 1875

Mar. 4, 1873 Mar. 3, 1877

Nov. 22, 1875 Mar. 3, 1877

1

3

10

Ulysses S. Grant

Ditto

Took oath of office
as President,
Sept. 20, 1881

Mar. 4, 1881 Mar. 3, 1885

Sept. 20, 1881 Mar. 3, 1885

3

5

13

Thomas A. Hendricks

Died Nov. 25, 1885

Mar. 4, 1885 Mar. 3, 1889

Nov. 25, 1885 Mar. 3, 1889

3

3

7

Grover Cleveland

Garret A. Hobart

Died Nov. 21, 1899

Mar. 4, 1897 Mar. 3, 1901

Nov. 21, 1899 Mar. 3, 1901

1

3

11

William McKinley

Theodore Roosevelt

Took oath of office
as President,
Sept. 14, 1901

Mar. 4, 1901 Mar. 3, 1905

Sept. 14, 1901 Mar. 3, 1905

3

5

18

William McKinley, died
Sept. 14, 1901

James S. Sherman

Died Oct. 30, 1912

Mar. 4, 1909 Mar. 3, 1913

Oct. 30, 1912 Mar. 3, 1913

0

4

5

William H. Taft

Calvin Coolidge

Took oath of office
as President,
Aug. 3, 1923

Mar. 4, 1921 Mar. 3, 1925

Aug. 3, 1923 Mar. 3, 1925

1

7

2

Warren G. Harding, died
Aug. 2, 1923

Harry S. Truman

Took oath of office
as President,
Apr. 12, 1945

Jan. 20, 1945 Jan. 20, 1949

Apr. 12, 1945 Jan. 20, 1949

3

9

8

Franklin D . Roosevelt,
died Apr. 12, 1945

Lyndon B . Johnson

Took oath of office
as President,
Nov. 22, 1963

Jan. 20, 1961 Jan. 20, 1965

Nov. 22, 1963 Jan. 20, 1965

1

1

29

John F. Kennedy, died
Nov. 22, 1963

Total Period of Vacancy

w
-....!

James A. Garfield, died
Sept. 19, 18 81

Chester A. Arthur

Source: Ad apted from Table Prepared by History a nd General
Research Division, Library of Con gress
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Occasions on which the President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives or the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
were of opposite parties, 1864-1964
President and Party

Speaker and Party

President Pro
Tempore and Party

Michael C. Kerr - D
Samuel J. Randall - D

Thomas W. Ferry -

R

Rutherford B. Hayes-R

Samuel J. Randall -

D

Thomas W. Ferry -

R

46th Cong. 1879-81

Rutherford B. Hayes-R

Samuel J. Randall -

D

Allen G. Thurman -

48th Cong. 1883-85

Chester A. Arthur -

R

John G. Carlisle -

D

George F. Edmunds -

49th Cong. 1885-87

Grover Cleveland -

D

John G. Carlisle -

D

John Sherman -

R

50th Cong. 1887-89

Grover Cleveland -

D

John G. Carlisle -

D

John J. Ingalls -

R

52n<l Cong. 1891-93

Benjamin Harrison -

Charles F. Crisp -

D

Charles F. Manderson -

54th Cong. 1895-97

Grover Cleveland -

Thomas B. Reed -

R

William P. Frye -

62nd Cong. 1911-13

William H. Taft-R

44th Cong. 1875-77

Ulysses S. Grant -

45th Cong. 1877-79

R

R
D

Champ Clark -

D

R

Frederick H. Gillett -

R

Albert B. Cummins -

John Nance Garner -

D

George H. Moses -

72nd Cong. 1931-33

Herbert C. Hoover -

30th Cong. 194 7-49

Harry S. Truman -

R4th Cong. 1955-57

Dwight D. Eisenhower -

R

Sam Rayburn -

D

Walter F. George -

85th Cong. 1957-59

Dwight D. Eisenhower -

R

Sam Rayburn -

D

Carl Hayden -

D

86th Cong. 1959-61

Dwight D. Eisenhower -

R

Sam Rayburn -

D

Carl Hayden -

D

Joseph Martin, Jr. -

D

Soiin:c: F11cydop11C'diu Uritannirn. Compiled from Hiowaphical Directory of the
A 111airn11 Co11,r.,·rc.1.\. 1774-1961.
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R

R
R
R
R

Woodrow Wilson -

R

R

R

William P. Frye - R
Charles Curtis - R
Augustus 0. Bacon Jacob H. Gallinger Henry Cabot Lodge Frank B. Brandegee -

66th Cong. 191 9-21

D

D

R

Arthur Vandenberg -

R
D

R

Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent

Page I 3-By

WILLIAM BENTON:

1 regret that the Committee has not weighed the possibility of abolishing the
Vice Presidency altogether. Some of the framers of the Constitution, I am told,
shared my views. Some felt that special elections should be held in case of presidential
vacancies; any Vice President was merely to be a caretaker until a special election
could be held. ( l would add that another officer of the government. such as the
Speaker of the House, who is always an experienced politician. could serve equally
well as the interim caretaker.)
The Committee has not explicitly considered the pros and cons of abolishing the
Vice Presidency. Its principal "con", according to this report, is this: "An extra
nationwide election with the campaigning and other interruption of the normal governmental process that it entails, particularly coming most of the time after a President's death, is much too disruptive for the benefits to he gained ." This argument
seems to me very weak. Why should a special election for the Presid ency he any more
disruptive than a regular election? Indeed , the reverse might be true. An election
after the death of a President might he conducted in a more sober way - and in a
shorter period - than is ordinarily the case - and that would be all to the good.
Further. why shouldn't an election after a President's death or disability be for a full
four-year term, and not merely for th e balance of an unfilled term? Thus the word
"extra" is misleading. There's nothing sacrosanct about the present rhythm. Any
four-year rhythm on the even years would have the same impact ; the even years
maintain the identity of the presidential election with the Congressional elections.
However. there may be good arguments for holding the election within 90 days or
for the odd years, separating the two .
What are the benefits of abolishing the Vice Presidency? One of the standards set
forth for evaluating proposals on presidential succession is "legitimacy of title." Surely
a person elected President in his own right has a legitimacy no other person can have.
Effective presidential leadership may sufTcr by the limited mandate even a man of high
caliber may enjoy as a successor President rather than as an elected President. Even
more limiting and dangerous is the succession of a mediocre Vice President. Need we
risk Mr. Throttlcbottom?
In thi s century - but not in the 19th - the U. S. has been lucky . Theodore
Rooseve lt , Harry Truman and L yndon Johnson were gifts of fortune rather than
careful , deliberate choices. lronicall y enough, Teddy Roosevelt was singled out for
the Vice Presidency not because his talents were esteemed but because they were
feared . Boss Platt maneuvered him into the Vice Presidency in 1900 in order to
prevent his re-election as Governor of New York - and to bring his booming political
career to a dead end. Harry Truman went to the 1944 Convention as campaign
manager for James Byrnes.
Thus too often vice presidential nominees arc chosen in a careless or arbitrary
manner, often to "balance the ticket.'' Nixon was picked in a smoke-filled room
becau se it was felt a veteran from California - with an anti-communist record to
embarrass Truman - would strengthen the ticket; Sparkman was chosen by a smaller
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group in a smaller room to assuage the South; Wallace to butter up the west and the
farmers.
Within the terms which the Committee set for itself - that of rationalizing and
improving present practices - J concur with its recommendations. I am sorry,
however, that the Committee did not seize its opportunity to analyze more deeply
the political as well as Constitutional problems and ambiguities surrounding the presidential succession. Modest, pragmatic solutions are not always the best.
I am not sure a constitutional amendment would be required to meet my
objective. J have no strong objection to the existence of a Vice Presidency, if it is
understood that the incumbent would act as President for an interim period only.
Indeed, there arc reasonable arguments for two vice presidents. My principal objective is the consideration of the advisability of the special election.
Page

15-By

JOHN

F.

MERRIAM:

I strongly favor amending the Constitution to provide for a second Vice President to be elected. This would eliminate almost all of the uncertainties involved when
the first Vice President succeeds to the Presidency. It is absurd to say that there is
not enough work for two Vice Presidents of stature when the policy statement states
at the beginning that the Presidency is the toughest job in the world.
Page

16-By

JoHN

F.

MERRIAM:

I believe that approval should be by the Senate only. This is a regular and
publicly accepted method of approval of Presidential appointments for which established procedures exist. Cabinet members' appointments are not approved by both
Houses, yet they are proposed to be included in the Presidential succession pattern.
(This also applies to recommendation 3 on same page.)
Page

19-By JOHN F.

MERRIAM:

I agree except that the order of succession by Cabinet heads should be reviewed
in the light of present circumstances.
Par;e 29-By JoHN F. M ERRIAM:

J strongly disagree. The question of "inability" is one of fact or law, or both. It
is essential that it not be a political matter. It should not be determined by those in
the line of succession who are directly benefited regardless of their high characters.
I recommend that the question of " inability" be determined by the Chief Justice of the
United States. The decision should be made by one person as the definition of
"inability" is not subject to a group decision nor is the anonymity of a group decision
desirable. The Constitution can be amended and the determination as to the fact or
law of "inability" does not interfere with the separation of powers provided in the
Constitution.
Page 29- By C. WREDE P ETERSM EYER:

I believe that Presidential inability should be determined only by a majority
vote of the Cabinet and that discussions leading to such a vote should be initiated

40

Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent (continued)
only by a member of the Cabinet. R emoving the Vice President from the opportunity
to initiate discussions leading to such a vote or responsibility for concurring in the
decision will act as a shield against possible public criticism of the Vice President
influencing for personal reasons the vote of the Cabinet.
Page 33-By JOHN F. MERRIAM :

I oppose the recommendation. The reasoning applicable to the determination of
"inability" applies here as expressed in an earlier footnote. Again it is recommended
that the Chief Justice of the United States determine the fact or law of the ending of
Presidential "inability."
Page 35-By JOHN F. MERRIAM:

All of the above footnotes are, of course, applicable to the conclusions set
forth on pages 34 and 35 .
An omission from the policy statement that should be cured is to provide for
the "inability" of a Vice President in the same manner as the "inability" of the
President.
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EVERETI NEEDHAM CASE, President
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

GEORGE M. HUMPHREY

RFl!BFN B. ROBERTSON
Honorary Chairman of the Board
Champion Papers Incorporated

Ch:1irman, Finance Committee
Nation:ll Steel Corporation

Scottsdale, Arizona

HENRY R. JOHNSTON
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida

HARRISON JONES
Atlanta, Georgia

FRANK A. CHRISTENSEN
New York. New York

W. L. CLAYTON
Anderson, Clayton & Co., Inc.
M. W. CLEMENT
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

JOHN L. COLL YER
The B. F. Goodrich Company
S. SLOAN COLT
New York, New York
JAMES B. CONANT
Berlin-Oahlern, Germany

JAYE. CRANE
New York, New York
FRED J. EMMERICH
Harrison, New York
JAMES A. FARLEY, Chairman of Board
The

Coca~Cola

Export Ctirp.

EDMUND FITZGERALD
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

RALPH E. FLANDERS
Springfield, Vermont

PERCIVAL E. FOERDERER
Philadelphia, Pennsylvani;:i

CLARENCE FRANCIS
New York, New York

ALFRED C. FULLER

ERNEST KANZLER

RAYMOND RUBICAM
F. (

SAMMONS

Chairman of the Board Emeritus
United SLttcs Bank of Oregon
llAHl{Y SCHERMAN. Chrm. of the Board
HPok-of-lhe-Month Club. Inc.

Detroit, Michigan

El.I.IS D. SLATER

Fl.MERL. LINDSETH. Chairman
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.

Chairm:in, Exec. Committee
Emery Air Freight Corporation

HOMER J. LIVINGSTON, Chairman

11. CllRISTIAN SONNE

f"he First National Bank of Chicago
GEORGE H. LOVE, Chairman of Board
Consolidation Coal Company, Inc.

ROBERT A. LOVETT, Partner
Rrnwn Bwthers Harriman & Co.
I F. \1cCOI I ll~v1. Cluirm;rn
C(1ntincntal Oil Company

FOWLER McCORMICK
Chicago, Illinois

RALPH McGILL. Publisher
Thl' Atlanta Constitution

.JAl\fES H. McGRAW, JR.
~cw

York, New York

FRANK L MAGEE
('h:iirm:in, Fxccutive Committee
Aluminum Company of Americ;:i

New York, New York

.JOSFPll P. SPANG, JR.
The Gillette Company
ROBERT G. SPROUL. President Emeritus
The University of California

ELMER T. STEVENS, Chairman
Chas. A. Stevens & Co.

JOHN P. STEVENS. JR.
J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc.

JOHN STUART
The Quaker Oats Company

H. GARDINER SYMONDS. Chairman
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.

ALAN H. TEMPLE
New York, New York

MAXWELL M. UPSON

N:1tional Lead Company

Honorary Chairman of the Board
Raymond International Inc.

C H. MOSES

CHARLES E. WILSON

.JOSEPH A. MARTINO. President

Moses. McClellan & McDermott

New York, New York

MALCOLM MUIR. Honorary Chairman
Newsweek

.IAMFS W. YOUNG
Pena Blanca. New Mexico

Chairman of the Board
The Fuller Brush Company

W. A. PATTERSON. Chairman

HARRY W. ZINSMASTER, Chairman

United Air Lines

Zinsmastcr Baking Company

J. V. HERD, Chairmnn of the Ro:inls
The Continental Insurance Companies

T. S. PETERSEN

JOHN S. ZINSSER

San Francisco, California

S"veet Briar, Virginia

TRUSTEES ON LEA VE
FOR FULL-TIME GOVERNMENT SERVICE
GEORGE C. McGHFE, United States Amhassador
The American Embassy, Ronn, Cicrm;111y

GEORGE ROMNEY
The Governor of Michigan

WILLIAM M. ROTH
Deputy
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.I AMES F. WEBB, Administrator

National Aeronautics and Space Administralinn
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Research Division
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RO!ffRT F. STEADMAN. Director
ROBERT F. LEKHART. Assoc. Director
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KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER

S. CHARLES BLEICH
Secretary, Board of Trustees

R. SHAl.E PAUL
.J()I!-..; F. SA\!PSON

1Ji1rrih11tion Di1·ision

ERNFST W. GROSS, Director
Area Development Division
JOHN H. NIXON, Director
PAUL H. GERHARDT
DONALD R. GILMORE
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HFRBERT MALLEY, Director
ROBERT M. SCHNEIDER

Com{'troller and Ass/. Treasurer
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International Library

Increasingly close relationships are being developed with independent,
nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. These organizations are composed of businessmen and scholars, have objectives similar
to those of CED, and pursue them by similarly objective methods. In
several cases, agreements for reciprocal distribution of publications
have developed out of this cooperation. Thus, the publications of the
following international research organizations can now be obtained in
the United States from CED:

CEDA

Committee for Economic Development of Australia
342 Flinders Street, Melbourne, Victoria

CEDTT

The Committee for Economic Development of
Trinidad and Tobago
P. 0. Box 499, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, W.I.

CEMLA

Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos
Durango Num. 54, Mexico 7, D. F.

CEPES

Comitato Europeo per ii Progresso Economico e Sociale
Via Clerici N. 5, Milan, Italy

CEPES

Europaische Vereinigung fiir
Wirtschaftliche und Soziale Entwicklung
Schwindstrasse 8, Frankfurt /M., Germany

CEPES

Groupe National Franc;ais Comite Europeen
pour le Progres Economique et Social
29, Rue Franr;ois Jer, Paris- VIIJe, France

IPES

Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais
Rua Bahia I 31, Sao Paulo, Brazil
Keizai Doyukai
(Japan Committee for Economic Development)
Japan Industrial Club Bldg.
I Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan

PEP

Political and Economic Planning
I 2 Upper Belgrave Street, London S. W. I, England

SIE

Seminarios de Jnvestigaci6n Econ6mica
Plaza del Rey, I, Madrid - 4, Spain

SNS

Studieforbundet Naringsliv och Samhalle
Skoldungagatan 2, Stockholm 0, Sweden

